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The Transformation of an Academic
Discipline: Law Professors in the Past
and Future (or Toy Story Too)
Stephen M. Feldman
The academic discipline of law is undergoing a transformation that has law
professors confronting a profound crisis of identity. To probe this identity
crisis, one must first understand the historical development of the legal
academic as a professional. With that foundation in place and the crisis
analyzed, one can begin to envision a worthwhile future for the legal academic. To facilitate this examination of the past as well as the future of law
faculty, I begin with the movie Toy Story.' One theme of the movie revolves
around Buzz Lightyear's confrontation with his own identity crisis. Law professors could learn much from Buzz and from how he handles his predicament.
Toy Story opens with eight-year-old Andy playing in his bedroom. Andy's
cowboy rag doll, Sheriff Woody, is always the hero in imaginary adventures.
Whenever Andy leaves the room, Woody still stands tall as the leader of all the
toys, who magically come alive. One day Andy bursts into his bedroom,
brushes Woody from his customary perch of honor on the bed, and replaces
him with a new toy. When Andy once again leaves the room, Woody starts to
introduce himself to the new toy, who interrupts. "I'm Buzz Lightyear, space
ranger, Universe Protection Unit," he says earnestly. "My ship has crashlandcd here by mistake."
Woody and the other toys realize that, unlike them, Buzz Lightyear does
not know he is a toy. Buzz believes he truly is a space ranger whose purpose is
to save the galaxy from the evil Emperor Zurg. Before long, Woody has grown
frustrated with Buzz's confident insistence that he is a real space ranger. But
Buzz, too, has become distraught. "Because of you," he yells at Woody, "the
security of this entire universe is in jeopardy!"
"What?" Woody exclaims. "What are you talking about?"
"Right now, poised at the edge of the galaxy, Emperor Zurg has been
secretly building a weapon with the destructive capacity to annihilate an entire
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planet! I alone have information that reveals this weapon's only weakness.
And you, my friend, are responsible for delaying my rendezvous with Star
Command!"
"You are a toy!" Woody rages. "You aren't the real Buzz Lightyear! You're- an action figure! You are a child's plaything!"
Buzz remains unshaken. "You are a sad, strange little man," he tells Woody,
"and you have my pity."
Through a series of misadventures, Woody and Buzz eventually find themselves trapped in the house of Andy's nasty next-door neighbor. Trying to
escape, they separate. Buzz then hears a voice from another room: "Calling
Buzz Lightyear. Come in, Buzz Lightyear. This is Star Command."
Thrilled, thinking Star Command finally is responding to his entreaties,
Buzz follows the sound of the voice-only to discover a television. Stunned, he
watches a commercial for Buzz Lightyear action figures. The commercial ends
unequivocally: Buzz is a toy, "available at all Al's Toy Bar outlets."
Buzz is shaken by an identity crisis of seismic magnitude. The foundation
for his life's meaning has crumbled. He becomes despondent, enervated.
"Youwere right all along," he mumbles to Woody. "I'm not a space ranger. I'm
.just a toy. A stupid little insignificant toy." Buzz's past has been false, and his
future seems to him hopelessly bleak.
My thesis is that law faculty today, as a collectivity, are facing an identity crisis
much like Buzz Lightyear's. As we begin the new millennium, we must confront
a change in our self-understanding equal in severity to his change from space
ranger to toy. For his entire life Buzz had understood the world from the
perspective of a space ranger. That worldview shattered in an instant, and Buzz
had to confront an uncertain future as a toy. His previous frames of reference,
his certainties and assumptions, would no longer provide support and sustenance. Anyone would find such a prospect frightening and dispiriting.
Since the post-Civil War era law professors have perceived themselves first
and foremost as lawyers. 2 For the most part, during that time, we were lawyers
teaching students about the law and about how to practice law. But we were
not merely lawyers teaching apprentices. We were law professors, mostly in
university-affiliated law schools, who wrote scholarly articles and books. Even
so, our scholarship revolved around our perception of ourselves as lawyers.
We wrote to reform and to improve the law. Through our scholarship we
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directly participated in the legal system, in legal and judicial practices, by
advising lawyers andjudges, or at least so we imagined.
Today law professors' sense of themselves as primarily lawyers is crumbling.
Our claimed connection to legal andjudicial practices, our imagincd participation in the legal system, increasingly appears spurious. Recent recommendations for the future direction of legal scholarship reflect our uncertainties.'
But if we are not lawyers, what are we? The most likely answer-our new or
future self-identity, so to speak-appears to be that we are university professors. But this answer provides a future that seems, to many, as uncertain and
frightening as Buzz's prospective life as a toy. If, after all these years, we
recognize that we really are more university professor than lawyer, then
exactly what type of university professor might we be? What are our purposes?
The first part of this article traces the emergence and development of the
university-affiliated law school and law faculty. It stresses, in particular, the
role played in this development by a drive to professionalize the legal academic, and the way that professionalization was manifested in legal scholarship. The second part begins by exploring a recent breakdown in law professors' traditional self-identification. After about a century when most legal
academics thought of themselves primarily as lawyers, an increasing number
today identify themselves chiefly as university professors. Given this transformation of the academic discipline of law, what about its future? What type of
university professors can legal academics be, particularly if they no longer
write scholarship oriented around the practices of lawyers and judges? One
answer lies in interdisciplinarity. Law schools already tend to be more interdisciplinary than other departments, and law professors might stake out a new
expertise, as interdisciplinarians.
The Development of the Law Professor
The Law School Emerges
Antebellum Legal Education and Postbellum Universities
From the nation's inception through the Civil War, the usual route to
becoming an attorney was through an apprenticeship, "the purely practical
training of young law students in the office of ajudge or practising attorney. "'
The first American law schools developed in the late eighteenth century in
those law offices that were most proficient at teaching their apprentices.
Instruction at these proprietary schools was by practicing lawyers and judges
who taught mainly through lectures, sometimes reading their notes verbatim
to the students. Similarly, the first American legal scholars were practicing
lawyers and judges, including St. George Tucker, James Kent, and Joseph
Story. James Wilson, one of the original Supreme Courtjustices, delivered the
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first lectures on American constitutional law, drawing widely from political
philosophy, moral theory, and history. For him and for other early American
scholars, law could not be understood in isolation. The scholar needed to
understand all aspects of society and nature (no small task) to gain a grasp on
the operations of the legal system.
In the early years of the nation, some American colleges also provided legal
training as part of a liberal education; students learned law as much to be
good citizens as to be lawyers. Likewise, during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, the first college-sponsored law schools, such as Virginia,
William and Mary, and Maryland, attempted to teach law consistently with the
broad humanistic aspirations of scholars like Wilson and Story. But during the
era of Jacksonian democracy, from the 1820s through the 1840s, populist
pressures to liberalize bar admissions forced legal educators to adjust their
goals. The populist sentiments of that period led many states to reduce or
even to eliminate the requisite apprenticeship training for admission to their
respective bars. By 1840 only eleven of thirty states and territories required any
period of apprenticeship. In reaction, legal educators, even at the best colleges, were pressured to lower their aspirations and goals and to focus on
professional training.5
After the Civil War, however, during a time of rapid industrialization,
professions in general came of age as lay people sought expert guidance for
new technologies. 6 Unsurprisingly, this era saw the rapid growth of
professionalization in law. Even before the war many states had begun to
7
reverse the Jacksonian lowering of standards for bar admission. After the war
the development of large corporations led to the emergence of an elite corps
of lawyers dedicated to servicing the new well-heeled clientele. These elite
practitioners spearheaded the creation of "city and state bar associations,
capped in 1878 by the American Bar Association."' The goal of these organizations supposedly "was to institute stricter standards of admission to the bar
and to curb what they saw as unprofessional behavior."' Simultaneously,
though, professionalization in law and in other occupations entailed the
control of a specific type of knowledge and allowed the members of the
profession to monopolize a segment of the economic marketplace."
Postbellum professionalization was intertwined with the emergence and
growth of a new type of American university. The old antebellum colleges had
focused on the liberal arts and the classics. Education had been designed to

5.

Alfred Zantzinger Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law 142-43, 148-50 (New
York, 1921); Bloomfield, supra note 2, at 38.
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Larson, supra note 2, at 104; see Bloomfield, supra note 2, at 39 (on experts).
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Reed, supra note 5,at 90-91; Bloomfield, supra note 2,at 38-39.
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Larson, supra note 2, at 167 (quoting Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920, at
117 (NewYork, 1967)); seeJohn A. Matzko, "The Best Men of the Bar": The Founding of the
American Bar Association, in High Priests, supra note 2, at 75.
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10. AndrewAbbott, The System of Professions 2 (Chicago, 1988); see Larson, supra note 2, at xvixvii.

Law Professors in the Past andFuture (or Toy Story Too)
inculcate "mental discipline," as well as "piety and strength of character.""
The new universities instead emphasized culture, service, and research. 2
American higher education itself, one might say, became professionalized.
The postbellum educational emphasis on culture signaled the strongest link
to the antebellum college; educators did not totally repudiate the old concern
for the liberal arts, the classics, and the nurturing of mental discipline. But in
the new universities the dominance of that older view diminished vis-;-vis the
growing emphasis, fueled by industrialization, on service and research. To a
large degree, the universities were expected to serve "in a utilitarian fashion"
the "emerging industrial technological society."' 3 For many educators, however, the key mission of the new universities was research: "the pursuit of truth
14
...for its own sake."
Many of these postbellum researchers cloaked themselves with the authoritativeness of science; they claimed to discover objective truths through the use
of formalistic methods, focusing on axiomatic principles and logically ordered and coherent systems. Regardless, from the perspective of the practitioners of a profession like medicine or law, the greatest virtue of university
education typically lay not in educational service or research, but in legitimation: academic training and knowledge gave professional practices an aura of
scientific rigor and rationality-even if the professionals did not actually
conduct their practices along such lines. 5
The Modern Law School
The modem law school began to emerge in 1870. The president of Harvard,
Charles Eliot, a leader in developing the new universities, had personally
selected Christopher Columbus Langdell for the law school faculty in 1869.
Langdell became dean a year later and began to implement Eliot's vision of a
university discipline within the law school. Not incidentally, because of the
advantages that would accrue to practicing lawyers and judges, as professionals, leading members of the bar favored the development of universityaffiliated law schools.' Reciprocally, educational pioneers like Eliot would
benefit, as they worked to build the new universities, if they could enlist the
support of elite professionals, including lawyers and judges. But from the
perspective of Eliot and other educators, like Andrew Dixon White of Cornell,
if professional schools were to be included within the new universities, then
the professional schools would need to fit within the model of a university
discipline. Being a man of his times, Langdell understood precisely what was
necessary: law teaching and research would have to be scientific. "[I]f law be
11.

Laurence R. Veysey, The Emergence of Lite American University 9 (Chicago, 1965).

12. Id. at 12, 58; Laurence Veysey, Higher Education as a Profession: Changes and Continuities,
in Professions, supra note 2, at 15, 18-20, 27-29.
13. Veysey, supranote 12, at 18-19; Marsden, supra note 2, at 155.
14. Veysey, supranote 12, at 18.
15. Abbott, supra note 10, at 56-57; Larson, supra note 2, at 17.
16. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom and Political Neutrality in Law Schools: An Essay on
Structure and Ideology in Professional Education, 43J. Legal Educ. 315, 319 (1993).
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not a science," Langdell said, "a university will best consult its own dignity in
declining to teach it. If it be not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may
7
best be learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who practices it."
The Langdellian conception of the science of law corresponded closely
with the contemporary general view of science dominant within the universities. Langdellian legal scientists, in both their teaching and their research,
sought to discover objective legal truths through the use of formalistic methods. They focused on axiomatic principles and a logically ordered and coherent system of law. To teach the science of law, as he understood it, Langdell
introduced the case method of teaching. Instead of presenting legal principles and rules through lectures, as typified antebellum legal teaching, the
case method required the teacher to cover a series ofjudicial cases or, more
specifically, a series of appellate opinions. By using a form of Socratic questioning, the teacher was to lead the students through an analysis of the cases
and help them recognize the legal principles supposedly immanent in the
cases. The case method was the best way to teach, Langdell thought, because
the students learned how to handle the cases themselves, "the ultimate sources
of all legal knowledge.""8 The law professor was qualified to teach the students
since, as a legal scientist, he was experienced, not in the practice of law,
but rather in the learning of law-in the discovery of the principles from
the cases.' 9
In the Preface to his first casebook on contracts, Langdell not only revealed
why he was devoted to the case method of teaching but also implicitly delineated a methodology for scholarship beyond the writing of casebooks.
Langdellian scholars would begin either by stating, in the abstract, a small
number of axiomatic principles or by analyzing a series of cases to discover,
through inductive reasoning, the necessary axiomatic principles. Those principles then could govern all possible disputes within the relevant field of law.
More specific legal rules and the correct resolutions of legal issues could be
deduced, through abstract logical reasoning, from the principles. Ultimately
the common law could be logically arranged into a formal and conceptually
2°
ordered system.
What was the point of this research methodology? Most often, the
Langdellian scholar aimed to discover and articulate high-level principles, to
17. William R. Johnson, Schooled Lawyers: A Study in the Clash of Professional Cultures 103
(New York, 1978) (quoting C. C. Langdell, Harvard University, A Record of the Commemoration, November Fifth to Eight[h], 1886, on the Two Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of
the Founding of Harvard College 97-98 (Cambridge, Mass., 1887)). See also C. C. Langdell,
Teaching Law as a Science, 21 Am. L. Rev. 123, 123 (1887) [hereinafter Teaching Law]. Not
everyone agreed with Langdell's conclusion that law schools did, in fact, belong in universities. Thorstein Veblen said, "The law school belongs in the modern university no more than
a school of fencing or dancing." The Higher Learning in America 211 (New York, 1918),
quoted inJohn Henry Schlegel, Langdell's Legacy or, the Case of the Empty Envelope, 36
Stan. L. Rev. 1517, 1517 (1984).
18. Langdell, Teaching Law, supra note 17, at 123-24.
19. Id. at 124.
20. C. C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, at vi-vii (Boston, 1871); see
Feldman, supra note 2, at 91-101 (discussing Langdellian legal science as first-stage legal
modernism).
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deduce more specific legal rules, and to criticize judicial decisions that had
failed to follow this abstract doctrine. The very first article published in the
HarvardLaw Review, in 1887, archetypically illustrates this scholarly approach.
Written by Langdell's protfg6 James Barr Ames, the article, after a brief
introduction, states an abstract principle of property law: "A court of equity
will not deprive a defendant of any right of property, whether legal or equitable, for which he has given value without notice of the plaintiff's equity, nor
of any other common-law right acquired as an incident of his purchase." The
remainder of the article largely elaborates, through deductive logic, the
application of this principle in specific factual circumstances. Along the way,
Ames criticizes the leading case on this issue as well as other cases, which lie at
2
one point denounces as "hopelessly irreconcilable." '
Not all Langdellian scholarship conformed to this archetype exactly, but
most followed it to a large degree. Some articles focused on the historical
development of an abstract principle in the case law, with the purpose of
22
clarifying the precise nature of the principle. Others were devoted more to
of principles and rules,
systematization
and
the abstract rational classification
3
again for the purpose of clarification and precisionY Regardless of the exact
focus of the scholarship, the premises of Langdellian legal science were clear:
by carefully parsing cases, discovering axiomatic principles, and applying
those principles with rigorous deductive logic, the scholar could discern
specific legal rules as well as the single correct result in any judicial dispute,
whether hypothetical or real. In sum, Langdellian scholarship was distinctly
normative: it was oriented toward the correct statement of substantive legal
principles and rules so as to prescribe judicial outcomes. The Langdellians
confidently believed that they could denounce judges' decisions that were
substantively wrong-as a matter of law and logic (which were integrally
entwined)-and could enjoin the proper resolution of future cases. As Ames
explained, "the chief value ... of legal literature" was to correct or prevent
judicial error.24
In terms of professionalization, both for law teachers and for lawyers and
judges, the conception of law propagated by Langdellian legal science was
exquisitely expedient. The Langdellians presented the common law as an
arcane yet perfectly rational system of principles and rules. The implication
was that only lawyers and judges trained in university-affiliated law schools
could truly understand the law. And only Langdellian legal scholars, the
professors at the university-affiliated law schools, were competent to train
future lawyers andjudges and to conduct the scientific research necessary for

21. J. B. Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice, 1 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3, 7 (1887).
22. E.g.,J B. Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 Harv. L. Rev. 23 (1889); Samuel Williston, History
of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 105 (1888).
23. E.g., C. C. Langdell, Classification of Rights and Wrongs, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1900); C. C.
Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, I Harv. L. Rev. 55 (1887).
24. James Barr Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor, in Lectures on Legal History and
Miscellaneous Legal Essays 354, 366 (Cambridge, Mass., 1913).
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discovering the law.2 5 From this perspective, in the increasingly industrialized
and complicated society of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century
America, university law faculty, lawyers, and judges fulfilled necessary functions-and they were the only ones capable of performing those functions.
An additional component of the Langdellian conception of law contributed heavily to the professionalization of legal academics: Langdellians viewed
the legal system as autonomous from other aspects of society, so the science of
law was necessarily purified of nonlegal considerations. Supposedly, lawyers,
judges, and legal scholars were never to consider the social consequences of a
legal principle, legal rule, or judicial decision. Policy considerations, that is,
were deemed outside the ambit of the law. To apply the law, one must discover
the principles and apply them in a rigorous logical fashion. Because of the
autonomy of the legal system, the Langdellians reasoned, the study of law
required a highly specialized university department or discipline that was
separate and independent from other disciplines, such as history or government. And, of course, such a specialized university department of law required
professional experts-lawyers-to constitute its faculty. When Ames succeeded
Langdell as the dean at Harvard Law School, Ames unequivocally linked the
Langdellian conception of law and the need to have lawyers as professors: "We
are unanimously opposed to the teaching of anything but pure law in our
department.... We think that no one but a lawyer, teaching law, should be a
26
member of a Law Faculty."
This desire for a purified discipline, it is worth noting, was not (and is not)
unique to law. Each academic department needs to legitimate its existence,
and specialization in a unique discipline is a propitious means for doing so. If
law faculty were to teach and research subject matter already covered adequately in, for instance, literature, anthropology, or history departments,
why would we need law schools? The Langdellians were merely following suit,
so to speak: they sought to show that the law school, as much as any other
department, belonged in the new university. Moreover, this academic differentiation and specialization would need to be reproduced with each new
generation of faculty, or the discipline and the department would be threatened. Indeed, academic disciplines often tend to become increasingly isolated, specialized, and parochial.
Although the postbellum emergence of the new universities, with their
professional schools, benefited the professions of law and medicine, "the
organized professions by no means conceded control of these university
schools; they were in the university but not of it." 27 Especially in law, elite
practitioners and university leaders pushed for different types of schools.
25.

See Gerard W. Gawalt, The Impact of Industrialization on the Legal Profession in Massachusetts, 1870-1900, in High Priests, supra note 2, at 97, 107-08 [hereinafter Impact]; Robert W.
Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York City
Lawyers, 1870-1910, in High Priests, supra note 2, at 51, 55-56; cf. Gerard W. Gawalt,
Introduction, in High Priests, supra note 2, at vii, vii.

26. Quoted in Stevens, supranote 2, at 40 (emphasis added); see, e.g., C. C. Langdell, A Summary
of the Law of Contracts, 2d ed. (Boston, 1880).
27. Abbott, supra note 10, at 207.
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Practitioners wanted law schools that emphasized legal practice-"ideal law
office" schools that combined "theoretical instruction with a wide range of
practice courses.. "2. Meanwhile, university leaders sought to develop highly
theoretical and academically selective law schools that would mirror the rest of
the university, bolstering the dominant view of science as well as the prestige
of the university. They recognized, moreover, that the case method of teaching, supposedly grounded scientifically, enabled law school classes to remain
large, with as many as 150 students, which for the universities was economically more profitable than having smaller practice-oriented classes. 9 These
two competing visions of a law school-the practical and the theoreticalstruggled for supremacy from around 1870 to 1900, when a number of forces
combined to propel the theoretical model to dominance."
The Langdellian law professors, finding themselves in effect standing between these opposed camps, tried to keep one foot on each side, though they
leaned more toward the practitioners. They preferred the theoretical and
selective type of law school, but they nonetheless primarily identified themselves as lawyers. The perspective of James Barr Ames underscores this selfidentity. Langdell hired Ames, a former Harvard Law School student, as an
assistant professor even though Ames had had no practice experience. Yet, as
already mentioned, Ames declared that "no one but a lawyer... should be a
member of a Law Faculty."'" Apparently Ames, the prototypical professional
legal academic, viewed himself primarily as a lawyer, despite his lack of
experience practicing law. University law schools, Ames explained, should
draw their faculty from "the best legal talent in the country. 3 2 There were at
least two reasons to see oneself as more lawyer than university professor. First,
the Langdellian law professors had been educated to be lawyers. Second,
there was an economic incentive: if law faculty maintained their identities as
lawyers, they could insist that the university pay them as elite lawyers rather
than as ordinary university professors.3 Unsurprisingly, then, because they
thought of themselves as lawyers (and because they often received higher
salaries than their university colleagues), law professors were never completely
accepted or comfortable in the universities, though they also were never fully
accepted as legal practitioners (because, after all, they were not the same as
other lawyers).

28. Johnson, supra note 17, at 83.
29. Kalman, supra note 2, at 12; Redlich, supranote 4, at 50-51. The economic profitability of the
case method became even more pronounced as legal education became postgraduate. At
Harvard, "[i]n 1896 an undergraduate degree became a requisite for entering the law school,
a requirement which did not become effective until 1909 and did not begin to be followed by
other leading law schools until 1916.' Larson, supra note 2, at 171. While undergraduate
classes might more commonly have 150 students, this certainly is not true of graduate
education in general.
30. Johnson, supra note 17, at 83-119.
31.

Quoted in Stevens, supra note 2, at 40, cf. LaPiana, supra note 2, at 15.

32. Ames, supra note 24, at 369 (emphasis added).
33. Cf. Gawalt, Impact, supra note 25, at 98-101 (discussing lawyers' salaries in late-nineteenthcentury Massachusetts).
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So, with one foot on each side, law faculty struggled to mediate the tension
between their dual positions as university professors and lawyers. And very
quickly legal scholarship emerged as the most important means of mediation.
Through their research and writing, Langdellian law professors attempted to
establish their credentials as scholarly university professors. Like their university colleagues, the law professors were engaged in scientific research. Moreover, as already discussed, the Langdellians' formalistic conception of the
science of law corresponded closely with the dominant contemporary views of
science. Yet the specific method and form of Langdellian legal scholarship
overlapped extensively with the practices of law and judicial decision making.
Langdellian law professors believed that through their scholarship they directly contributed to and participated in the legal system-in legal and judicial practices. First, they imagined that the audience for their normative
scholarship was the community of practitioners. They earnestly sought to
discover axiomatic legal principles and to prescribe their application, all for
the benefit of practicing lawyers and judges. Second, the Langdellian professors believed that they were using the same research and writing skills that
practicing lawyers andjudges used. The sources for the Langdellians' research
were nothing but the cases in the books-the very same cases that practitioners relied upon. The only difference was that the professors were more
rigorous and refined in their pursuit of scientific truth. After all, it was their
experience at and devotion to the scientific study of law that qualified them to
teach, or at least they so believed.
In sum, the method and form of their scholarship allowed the Langdellians
to identify themselves as lawyers first, but also as university professors. They
researched and wrote as if they were lawyers, and they wrote for lawyers and
judges. At the same time, the Langdellian conception of the science of law
resonated with the contemporary intellectual commitments to formalism and
objectivity. And the Langdellian scholars appeared to fulfill at least two general goals of the new universities: they were researchers pursuing truth, and
simultaneously they saw themselves as doing a practical service for the community, helping lawyers andjudges better perform their jobs.
Challengesand Responses
Why did the Langdellian model of a university law school eventually defeat
the ideal-law-office model? In 1900 twenty-five university law schools joined
together to form the Association of American Law Schools. It was intended to
serve the legal academyjust as the American Bar Association served practicing
lawyers and judges. The AALS explicitly established and attempted to enforce
minimum standards for legal education, particularly with regard to students'
prelegal education and the length of legal study. During its first two decades
of existence, the AALS raised its minimum standards several times, lengthening the required period of legal study and undermining part-time and nightschool programs. The implicit purpose was clear: "to promote the continued
Harvardization of legal training throughout the country." 4 Contrary to the

34. Bloomfield, supra note 2, at 43.
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methods of the ideal-law-office schools, law was to be taught through the case
method as a rigorous science.
At first the AALS did not enjoy great success. In fact, "enrollment in AALSmember schools dropped from 52 percent of all law students [in 1900] to 35
percent a quarter-century later .... ,,35 Yet during this time "the number of
member schools had more than doubled," so the primary reason for the
decreasing proportion of students attending AALS schools was "the growth of
nonmember proprietary and part-time schools.13 6 Over time, though, the
AALS cause gained strength as practitioners became increasingly supportive.
The ABA and leading lawyers andjudges, including many corporate attorneys, had been struggling for a number of years to institute more rigorous
standards for the practicing bar. The reasons were varied. To be sure, some
elite practitioners "were committed to an ethical, educated bar." 7 Just as
certainly, other and less noble reasons motivated the elite lawyers and judges.
For economic reasons, leading practitioners worked to control the work of
lawyers and the marketplace for it by regulating who could practice law and in
what manner. And for xenophobic reasons many lawyers andjudges sought to
preclude Jews, African-Americans, recent immigrants, and women from joining the bar." Small-town lawyers had initially opposed professionalization as a
ploy of the corporate bar, but after the United States entered World War I,
xenophobia persuaded them to join with the urban elites. 9
As lawyers and judges pushed for higher professional standards, their
interests merged with those of the university law teachers and the AALS. This
unification was furthered by an unexpected event. The ABA had asked the
Carnegie Foundation in 1913 to undertake a detailed study of legal education,
with the expectation that the final report would condemn proprietary and
part-time schools. But the report, Trainingfor the Public Profession of the Law,
written by Alfred Z. Reed and published in 1921, concluded that the pluralistic American population required diverse law schools. So instead of recommending, as anticipated, that every school follow the Langdellian model,
Reed recommended that support be given to the lower-echelon schools,
particularly those with part-time programs-those schools, in other words,
that catered to "workingmen, women, blacks, and ethnic minorities ... "'I
Despite Reed's intentions, his final report did not spark support for the
part-time law schools. To the contrary, it solidified the professors' and practitioners' joint opposition to the marginal schools and immigrant lawyers.
35. Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 46-47 (New York, 1989).
36. Id. at 47; Stevens, supra note 2, at 97-98.
37. Stevens, supra note 2, at 100.
38. Jerold S. Auerbach, UnequalJustice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modem America 74-101
(NewYork, 1976); Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit,
85 Cal. L. Rev. 1449, 1476-92 (1997); see also Abbott, supra note 10, at 2, 19-20; Larson, supra
note 2, at xii-xv.
39. Larson, supra note 2, at 173-74; see also Abel, supra note 35, at 71. But see Johnson, supra
note 17, at 155 (arguing small-town lawyers were more concerned with an overcrowded
profession).
40. Bloomfield, supra note 2, at 43; see Larson, supra note 2, at 174; Reed, supranote 5, at 414-20.
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When economic depression swept the country in the early 1930s, the combined forces of the established bar and the university teachers finally ensured
victory for the Langdellian model of the law school, pruned the bar of
immigrants, and muted economic competition. Many unaccredited schools
were driven out of business, and the case method of teaching spread into even
the remaining lower-level schools.4 '
Despite the victory of the Langdellian model, neither the case method of
teaching nor the Langdellian conception of legal science went unchallenged
or unchanged. Early on, the dean of Columbia Law School, Theodore W.
Dwight, was an outspoken critic of the case method. While it might be
pedagogically effective with the best students, Dwight argued, it was ineffective
with the majority, who either avoided participating in Socratic exchanges or
simply failed to glean their benefits. In 1914 Josef Redlich published a sustained critique of the case method. He echoed Dwight's criticism and added
that the case method hampered law teachers in the production of worthwhile
scholarship. 42 Others criticized the case method for not adequately preparing
students for the actual practice of law. In fact, even some of Langdell's
disciples had subtly shifted the purported central aim of the case method,
from teaching chiefly substantive legal principles to teaching "legal thinking"-that is, thinking like a lawyer.4
Vigorous criticisms also were directed at the Langdellian conceptions of
legal science and scholarship. Perhaps the earliest critic of the Langdellians
was Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who in 1880 denounced Langdell's unswerving devotion to deductive logic.4 4 Then in 1890 Louis D. Brandeis and his law
partner Samuel D. Warren published an influential article, "The Right to
Privacy," in the Harvard Law Review. Without expressly criticizing the
Langdellians, Brandeis and Warren departed from thcir methodology by
invoking societal changes as a basis for modifying the law. Specifically, Brandeis
and Warren argued that because of "[r]ecent inventions and business methods," the courts ought to recognize a right "to be let alone," or in other words
45
a right of privacy.
In the development of legal scholarship the article was significant in several
ways. Brandeis and Warren implicitly suggested that, contrary to the Langdellian
view, considerations of social policy could be legitimately invoked at appropriate points in legal arguments. In the early twentieth century this viewpoint
would develop into the sociological jurisprudence of scholars such as Roscoe
Pound, and then in the 1920s and 1930s sociological jurisprudence would

41. Johnson, supra note 17, at 154-55; Larson, supra note 2, at 174-75; Stevens, supra note 2, at
112-23.
42. Redlich, supra note 4, at 50-52; Stevens, supra note 2, at 57, 67 n.27, 117-18.
43. Reed, supra note 5, at 370; Stevens, supra note 2, at 162; see Redlich, supra note 4, at 24
(discussing Langdell's successors); Stevens, supra note 2, at 120 (discussing transformation of
case method).
44.

14 Am. L. Rev. 233-34 (1880) (reviewing C. C. Langdell, A Summary of the Law of Contracts,
2d ed. (Boston, 1880) (citation omitted)).

45. 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1890).
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evolve into American legal realism. Pound, who himself eventually would
become dean of Harvard Law School, denigrated Langdellian legal science in
1908 as "mechanical jurisprudence" for its arid and abstract formalism. He
thought common law judges should sometimes perform social engineering,
making law for the good of society.46
Despite this significant departure from the Langdellian approach, "The
Right to Privacy" was equally important for the two ways in which it resonated
with Langdellian legal science. First, Brandeis and Warren devoted most of
47
the article to the parsing of precedents. In doing so, they suggested that they
were not advocating a radical change in the law but rather were teasing out an
obscure yet already existent principle. Their incipient sociological approach
modified but did not repudiate the Langdellian methodology.
Second, whereas Langdellian writing already was normative, "The Right to
Privacy" and subsequent sociological jurisprudence established that the
normativeness of legal scholarship could (and should) be manifested in overt
recommendations for law reform. While the sociological jurisprudcnts might
have been inspired to favor law reform partly because of their political commitments to Progressivism, the urge to recommend legal reforms, whether
throughjudicial decision making or legislative enactment, became a hallmark
of legal scholarship for nearly a century. Often a law review article seemed
little different from a glorified appellate brief: it specified an issue, identified
and parsed the relevant cases, and recommended a solution that typically
entailed some reform of the legal doctrine.4 8 In 1920 Dean Thomas Swan of
Yale Law School declared that law schools "should aim ... to aid in improving
the law.... It is the duty of a university law school to emphasize through
research and publication by its faculty and through the character of its
instruction, this broader base of legal education, as well as to give the merely
professional training."49 As recently as 2000 a Michigan Law Review article
stated: "Reform scholarship is what law academics do; it is their calling and
50
their substance."
One of the most serious challenges to the Langdellian model of the law
school came in the 1920s. Inspired by the emergence of the empirical social
sciences, American legal realists began arguing that the Langdellians' devotion to abstract formalism should be replaced by a cominiuent to empirical
research. The realist critique of Langdellian legal science stressed that the
Langdellians' so-called axiomatic principles and logically deduced rules were
often no more than "transcendental nonsense"-concepts with no basis in

46. MechanicalJurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605 (1908); The Theory ofJudicial Decision, 36
Harv. L. Rev. 940 (1923); The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 Har. L.
Rev. 489 (1912).
47. Brandeis & Warren, supra note 45, at 201-14.
48. Cf FrancisJ. Mootz IIl, Desperately Seeking Science, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 1009, 1012 (1995)
(observing that "[n]ormative legal scholarship often amounts to glorified advocacy briefs").
49.
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50. ArthurAustin, The Postmodem Infiltration ofLegal Scholarship, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1504,1528
(2000) (book review).
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social reality. As Karl Llewellyn fiercely declared: "[G] eneral propositions are
empty ....
[R]ules alone ... are worthless."" To the most radical realists,
somewhat arbitrary stimuli, such as the hair color of a witness or the inflections of an attorney, seemed to produce idiosyncratic judicial decisions.52 But
most realist legal scholars believed that, by turning to social science research
methods, they could remake the legal system so that it would become more
firmly grounded on empirical reality. According to Walter Wheeler Cook:
"Only empirical observation can give one postulates useful in any particular
science, including legal science."53
An early hotbed for realism was Columbia Law School, where in 1926 the
faculty initiated a two-year study directed toward the improvement of legal
education. The results were summarized in a report written by Herman
Oliphant. His analysis revolved around the dual roles of the law teacher: as
lawyer and as university professor. Whereas law professors had traditionally
thought of themselves primarily as lawyers, Oliphant and the other realists
urged a stronger identification with the university. "The time has arrived for at
least one school to become a 'community of scholars,' devoting itself 'primarily to the non-professional study of law, in order that the function of law may
be comprehended, its results evaluated, and its development kept more nearly
in step with the complex developments of modern life,"' Oliphant explained.54
Oliphant and his realist colleagues sought to free themselves from the scholarly constraints imposed by their ties to practitioners. They advocated an
interdisciplinary approach to the study of law: the methods of the social
sciences would enable this new breed of legal scholar to gain a truly objective
understanding of the operation of law in society.
Three points about this challenge to the Langdellian paradigm bear emphasis. First, the realist challenge at Columbia failed. Dean Young B. Smith
confessed that, because of its ties to the legal profession, Columbia Law
School had too much to lose-by way of money, prestige, and usefulness-if it
oriented itself more closely to its parent university than to practitioners.55
Second, while the Langdellian legal scholars had originally been consonant
with the intellectual trends of their times as manifested in other university
disciplines, by the time of the realists those legal scholars who remained
committed to a Langdellian or quasi-Langdellian research approach were
bucking the dominant intellectual trends. The realists, to be sure, echoed
their contemporaries, but many other law professors of that time did not.
Though law teachers never had been completely accepted or comfortable in
51.
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the universities, an even greater distance now stretched between many of
them and their university colleagues in other departments.
Third, even the realists can be reasonably understood as merely modifying
and not repudiating the Langdellian approach to legal scholarship. While the
Langdellians had sought objectivity in abstract formalism, the realists sought
objectivity in empiricism. Regardless of their critique of Langdellian legal
science, then, most realists still sought objective truths about the law. Furthermore, they endorsed the commitment to normative law reform scholarship.
For instance, William 0. Douglas undertook an empirical study of the causes
of bankruptcy with the express purpose of recommending useful reforms of
the Bankruptcy Act." Karl Llewellyn aimed at reforming commercial law
along realist lines, while Felix Cohen sought to do the same for American
Indian law. For them, such reform translated into, first, replacing Langdellian
abstractions with narrow rules reflecting real-world situations and, second,
encouraging judges to pay closer attention to specific factual contexts. 7 In
short, the scholarship of many realists still revolved around the practices of
lawyers and judges; these realists believed they were directly contributing to
and participating in the legal system.
By World War II condemnations of realism had become commonplace.5 "
After the war a new approach to legal scholarship and jurisprudence rose to
dominance-"legal process," which reasserted the importance of the study of
pure law. The Langdellians had focused on the purity of the substantive law,
the axiomatic principles and the logically deduced rules. The legal process
thinkers, as their name suggests, instead sought purity through legal and
democratic processes. Henry M. Hart Jr. and Albert M. Sacks sounded the
clarion call of legal process: "[Governmental] decisions which are the duly
arrived at result of duly established procedures ... ought to be accepted as
binding upon the whole society unless and until they are duly changed."59 For
instance, legal process scholars maintained that a court's decision should be
deemed legitimate if the judge or judges followed the appropriate processes
or procedures for judicial decision making, called "reasoned elaboration. '
As explained by the legal process scholars, reasoned elaboration required a
judge to give reasons for a decision, to articulate those reasons in a detailed
and coherent manner, and to relate the decision to a relevant rule of law
applied in a manner logically consistent with precedent.
Significantly, the legal process thinkers believed they had managed to
rescue the rule of law from the realist critique of Langdellian formalism.
Judicial decision making, when done properly, was not arbitrary: it was a
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legitimate, rational, and objectively constrained governmental procedure. Yet
simultaneously the legal process scholars brought a diluted form of realism
into the mainstream of legal thinking. They explained that ajudge, in appropriate circumstances, should apply the law "in the way which best serves the
principles and policies it expresses."6 In other words, in the postrealist years,
many legal scholars (and lawyers and judges) readily acknowledged that policy
considerations are legitimately invoked at appropriate points in legal arguments. We are familiar with the platitude that "we are all realists now." Yet
from this perspective the law still remains pure. The processes of reasoned
elaboration neatly and safely enclose policy considerations so that they come
into play only in certain narrowly defined circumstances.
To a great degree, the legal process scholars were once again attempting to
mediate the opposition between their dual roles as lawyers and university
professors. In contrast to the Columbia realists' efforts to align themselves
more strongly with the university, the legal process scholars reasserted their
identities as primarily lawyers. They did so by incorporating the methods of
ideal legal and governmental actors into their conceptualizations of the
appropriate processes for different governmental institutions. For judicial
decision making, legal process scholars in effect imagined an ideal judge who
made an ideal judicial decision. They then solemnized the professional skills
and craft norms of that ideal judge as the processes for reasoned elaboration-that is, for acceptable judicial decision making.6 2 Moreover, the legal
process scholars understood themselves as playing an important role in the
legal system: advisers to the Supreme Court justices. For many years, starting
in 1951, the legal process scholars used the HarvardLaw Review Forewords to
send the Court an annual report card and to explain to the justices the
niceties of reasoned elaboration.63 The legal process thinkers, that is, remained fully committed to the conventions of normative law reform scholarship. At the same time, the legal process view of scholarship reaffirmed the
propriety of the law school and the lawyer-professor within the university.
Because legal scholarship revolved around the professional skills of practitioners, the law faculty appeared to possess an expertise unique among other
university faculty-exactly because they had themselves been trained in law
schools to be practicing attorneys andjudges.
For more than a century, then, since the origins of the legal academic
during the Langdellian years, law teachers have largely retained their self-
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identities as lawyers first and university professors second. Despite challenges
to and modifications of the Langdellian model of the law school, law professors have produced scholarship oriented toward their contribution to and
participation in the practices of law and judicial decision making. The early1980s dispute over critical legal studies illustrates the vigor of that selfidentification. Critical legal scholars saw themselves as the intellectual descendants of the realists; they sought to demonstrate the indeterminacy of traditional legal reasoning,just as the realists had sought to show that Langdellian
formalism was nonsensical. The crits went beyond the realists, though, by
insisting that the law is ideological: the law claims to be neutral and apolitical,
but in reality it favors powerful individuals and groups who already dominate
American society. To elaborate their attack on the American legal system, the
crits-again like the realists-were interdisciplinary. They invoked social theorists like Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, continental philosophers like Heidegger
and Sartre, anthropologists like Levi-Strauss, and numerous other intellectuals outside the traditional legal canon.64
Of course the CLS critique of the legal system generated hostility within
large segments of the legal professoriate. Paul D. Carrington of Duke Law
School exemplified this reaction. Labeling the crits "nihilist [s]," he declared
that if they taught their scholarly views to law students, they would destroy
their students' belief in the rule of law. When the students became attorneys,
they would lack professionalism and competence. Having been nurtured on
cynicism rather than "intellectual courage," they would practice "the skills of
corruption." Carrington's conclusion was especially telling: any crit who professes "that legal principle does not matter, has an ethical duty to depart the
law school, perhaps to seek a place elsewhere in the academy."65 The message
was clear. If crits did not sufficiently identify themselves with and as lawyers,
they should not teach in American law schools. A law professor has a duty to
maintain her own as well as her students' professional faith in the law.
Law Professors in Crisis
An Uncertain Identity
Today a growing gulf stretches between legal scholarship and the practices
of lawyers and judges, who regularly lament the inadequacy of legal scholarship and decry its uselessness for their work. In 1992 the ABA Section of Legal
Education published a report declaring, "Practitioners tend to view much
academic scholarship as increasingly irrelevant to their day-to-day concerns .
b...""
That same year Harry T. Edwards proclaimed "that judges,
administrators, legislators, and practitioners have little use for much of the
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67
scholarship that is now produced by members of the academy." More recently Alex Kozinski, echoing this complaint, criticized legal scholars for
insufficiently attending to the practical needs of lawyers and judges.68 Supreme Court justices have even taken to denigrating law professors in their
published judicial opinions."
The dissatisfaction of lawyers and judges with law schools and law faculty is,
of course, not new. A basic tension between practitioners and academics
emerged as early as the Langdellian period. But something is different today.
On the practitioners' side, many lawyers and judges may no longer sense a
strong need for the cultural legitimation that the law schools once provided
for the legal profession. When lawyers and judges were trying to establish
and strengthen their own professionalism after the Civil War, the advent of
university-affiliated law schools and Langdellian legal science proved most
advantageous. But today the legal profession is so well entrenched in the
structures, culture, and economy of American society that the scholarly productions of law professors may seem beside the point. Unsurprisingly, then,
empirical evidence supports the conclusion that courts look to legal scholarship for guidance less often than in the past. A survey of court opinions from
1975 to 1996 revealed "a 47.35% decrease in overall citations [of law review
articles] by the federal courts and state supreme courts combined."7 Another
study found that the U.S. Supreme Court had decreased its citations to legal
periodicals over a ten-year period, while yet another study concluded that the
"federal courts of appeals infrequently cite legal periodicals."71
On the academic side, an increasing number of contemporary legal scholars no longer write with the explicit or even implicit hope of influencing the
direction or reform of the law, either in courts or in legislatures. Some
scholars analyze and critique areas of the law, such as the First Amendment,
but nonetheless refuse to conclude with any traditional overt recommendation for law reform. 2 Others either argue expressly that legal scholarship
should refrain from recommending law reforms or maintain that such recom-
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mendations, for better or worse, are irrelevant to the practices of lawyers and
judges.73 Sanford Levinson, for one, admits that at least some of his writing "is
in no serious sense meant to be a contribution to the discussion of any of the
contemporary doctrinal issues. . . .I can't honestly say that I expect many
judicial readers nor am I willing to redirect my writing in ways likely to
74
increase the number."
The current rage among law faculty to write interdisciplinary scholarship
underscores the acute tension between academics and practitioners. Today
interdisciplinary work is more pervasive than ever before. In fact, as J. M.
Balkin reports, "Interdisciplinary scholarship is now an expected part of a
serious scholar's work at most of the elite law schools in this country."7 By
drawing on the methods and sources of other disciplines, ranging from
economics to continental philosophy, from literary criticism to anthropology,
interdisciplinary legal scholars distance themselves ever further from the skills
and concerns of practitioners.
As we law professors gaze across this growing chasm between practitioners
and the academy, we strangely and uncomfortably seem to resemble Buzz
Lightyear. Buzz had devoted his life to being a space ranger, saving the universe
from evil. When he discovered that he was not a real space ranger, the
foundation for his life crumbled away. He sank into ennui: how could his life be
meaningful if he were not a space ranger? What was the point of his existence?
Like Buzz, law faculty see the traditional foundation for the meaningfulness of
their work-lives-familial self-identification with practitioners-crumbling away.
For over a century, law professors have thought of themselves, first and
foremost, as contributing to and participating in the practices of lawyers and
judges. Butjust as Buzz earnestly kept calling Star Command while nobody was
listening, law professors now write to lawyers and judges who are not listening.
But if we stop writing to and for practitioners, if we stop writing the normative
law reform scholarship that draws almost exclusively on the methods and
norms of practitioners, then who or what are we?Just as Buzz was forced to face
a future where his previous frames of reference, his certainties and assumptions, could no longer provide support and sustenance, we very well might
need to do the same. This prospect may leave many of us dejected and daunted.
What, after all, is the point of our professional existence?
What might Toy Story suggest to us? What happens to Buzz when he realizes
that he is not a space ranger? At first, he is despondent and enervated, but
after a period of adjustment, he realizes that he still has an identity, as a toy.
And a toy can have a point or purpose in life, even if it is not to save the world.
Indeed, as Buzz accepts his new identity, he recognizes that his life can be
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meaningful exactly because he is a toy. As a toy action figure, Buzz has a
distinct reason for living: to play with Andy. This realization invigorates Buzz,
so that when he and Woody are struggling to escape from the nasty neighbor
boy, Buzz proclaims, "There's a kid over in that house who needs us!"
Well, if law faculty today are not primarily practitioners, then what are we?
The obvious answer: we are university professors. Remember, though, Buzz's
identity crisis consisted, in a sense, of two stages. First he recognized that he
was not a real space ranger. This recognition was sudden and, to say the least,
life shattering. But then, second, he had to accept his future as a toy, or in his
own words, a "stupid little insignificant toy." To overcome this initial selfdenigration took some time. At the outset, he just did not understand or
perceive the significance of being a toy. Law professors might well need to pass
through similar stages of crisis. In other words, we might first need to recognize that we are not primarily practitioners. But then, once we recognize
ourselves as university professors, first and foremost, many of us might still
question the significance of being a university professor. What is the point or
purpose of being a university professor of law?
In earlier times, particularly during the Langdellian era, law faculty could
readily mediate their dual roles as university professors and practitioners.
Their primary identification with the practices of lawyers andjudges provided
the ballast that kept them stable and well directed. For over a century, they
largely could use the skills and methods of practitioners to fulfill their university obligations as scholars. This convergence of the dual roles of university
professors and lawyers was indeed expedient. Law faculty, after all, had been
educationally trained to be lawyers and judges, so they were, as scholars,
merely using the tools or methods that were, in effect, ready at hand.
But today, as law professors self-identify increasingly as univcrsity professors, their mediation of the dual roles of academician and practitioner is not
as easily achieved for at least three reasons.
First, as I've said, some law professors no longer believe it is worthwhile or
effective to write normative reform scholarship, which is typically patterned
on legal andjudicial practices. After all, what is the point of writing law reform
scholarship ifjudges so rarely pay attention?
Second, and perhaps more to the point, many law faculty now lack the
requisite faith in the objectivity and effectiveness of lawyers' and judges'
traditional methods and norms. To be sure, significant technological, cultural, and social changes have transformed legal and judicial practices over
the past thirty years. The influx of women and minorities has changed the
demographic makeup of the profession, and the introduction of the computer has revolutionized research. Nevertheless, to a remarkable degree, legal
and judicial practices resemble those of a century ago. 'Judicial opinions still
purport to derive the legally required result from a correct statement of the
correct legal doctrine," Steven D. Smith observes. "They still engage in the
same citing and distinguishing of precedents, the same search for the meanings or intentions or purposes of statutes, and the same effort to extract from
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this disparate mass of materials univocal statements of what 'the law' is. 76'
Whereas the continued use of traditional legal rhetoric and reasoning might
make sense for practitioners, its use for legal scholarship seems increasingly
suspect. Despite the practices of lawyers and judges, overwhelming evidence
supports the view that legal reasoning does not lead to determinate conclusions. As Smith notes, "for many or perhaps most legal issues, arguments using
the standard techniques of legal discourse can be constructed tojustify inconsistent conclusions. One hardly needs any fancy theory or Derridean perversity to recognize this fact."' 77 Arthur J. Jacobson adds: "Not one rule suffers
from determinacy in the United States today.... I know. I've litigated.""8
Law professors today cannot easily mediate the dual roles of practitioner
and academic for a third reason: recent broad intellectual trends. Starting
with the development of the new universities after the Civil War and continuing at least into the post-World War II decades, scholars in most academic
departments aimed to develop and apply discrete disciplinary methods that
supposedly produced objective knowledge. Around the 1970s, however, their
consensus on the goal of academic research began to collapse. Spurred by the
same technological, cultural, and social changes that have altered the legal
profession, scholars in a variety of fields began to invoke concepts like
multiculturalism, postmodernisin, deconstruction, hermeneutics. Strong reactions against these ideas then led to open hostilities between competing
factions within departments and disciplines.79 Regardless, many scholars now
question the worthiness of particular disciplinary methods and even the
existence of objective knowledge and truths. These changes "have circulated
through every domain of academic discourse and have challenged and transformed intellectual practice in a plethora of fields, including science."' Partly
for this reason, then, interdisciplinary work is popular not just in law schools
but in departments across the university.
Besides their direct influence on the legal academy, these intellectual
trends have further driven a wedge between law professors' roles as academicians and as practitioners. From Langdell's time through the legal process era,
the goals of the traditional legal methods-objectivity and determinacy-were
consonant with the goals of scholars in most university disciplines. Legal
scholars could invoke those legal methods and still remain, to a reasonable
degree, within the mainstreams of intellectual thought. But today law faculty
who merely use traditional legal methods in their scholarship risk seeming
dangerously out of touch with contemporary intellectual trends. The earnest
76. Smith, supra note 3, at 1086.
77. Id. at 1073.
78. Taking Responsibility: Law's Relation tojustice and D'Amato's Deconstructive Practice, 90
Nw. U. L, Rev. 1755, 1755 (1996).
79. For examples of such critical reactions, see Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind
(New York, 1987); Arthur M. SchlesingerJr., The Disuniting of America, rev. & enlarged ed.
(New York, 1992).
80. Steven Best & Douglas Kellner, The Postmodern Turn at viii (New York, 1997). For discussions of changing views of science, see Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, 3d ed. (London,
1993); Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (New York, 1970).
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claims to neutrality, to objectivity, that typify legal argumentation are discordant with much university-produced scholarship.
No longer able so readily to mediate their dual roles, many law professors
likely will be pushed ever further into their academic role. They will become
increasingly aware of the distinction between, on the one hand, practitioners'
methods, litigation strategy, and judicial rhetoric and, on the other hand,
scholarly methods. As Stephen M. Griffin recently wrote, specifically referring
to constitutional law scholars, "[they can certainly write as lawyers or as
1
scholars, but not both at the same time."" Lawyers (in litigation) aim to win,
but legal scholars do not, except maybe to win publications and citations.
Judges must, for the most part, resolve disputes, no matter how complex the
case, so that one litigant wins and the other loses, but scholars need not reach
such reductive solutions.
So we come back to the question: what is the point or purpose of being a
university professor of law? What type of scholarship should we write? What is
our expertise? What gives our professional lives meaning? Once we remove our
ties to practitioners as the foundation for our scholarly existence, what's left?
A Possible Futurefor Law Professors
If law professors no longer base their writing predominandy on lawyers'
andjudges' methods, what will ground legal scholarship? One possible answer
is interdisciplinarity. Interdisciplinary work is in vogue with scholars in many
university departments who recognize that disciplinary boundaries are historically contingent and often developed for reasons more related to professionalization than to the discovery of truth or production of knowledge. Steve
Fuller puts it starkly: disciplinary "boundaries are necessary evils that become
1
more evil the more they are perceived as necessary. 82 Therefore, Fuller
sorts of problemscertain
"that
maintain
scholars
explains, interdisciplinary
increasingly those of general public interest-are not adequately addressed by
the resources of particular disciplines, but rather require that practitioners of
several such disciplines organize themselves in novel settings and adopt new
ways of regarding their work and co-workers."8 3 Interdisciplinary scholarship,
done well, can generate creative methods and original insights in previously
stale areas of thought.
While interdisciplinarity is popular in many university departments, it is
especially robust in law schools. To a degrec, law faculty merely are following
the contemporary trend. just as the Langdellians sought to secure their
professional positions in the universities by conceptualizing legal science in
accordance with the then-dominant general views of scientific research, interdisciplinary legal scholars of today can be understood as seeking to establish
and reinforce their professional worthiness among their university colleagues.

81. Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 Yale LJ. 2115, 2156 (1999) (emphasis added); see
Kahn, supra note 3, at 1-7.
82. Steve Fuller, Philosophy, Rhetoric, and the End of Knowledge 36 (Madison, 1993).
83. Id. at 33.
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But law schools are interdisciplinary leaders more than followers. Law schools
include faculty trained in other disciplines-economics, sociology, philosophy, history, or whatever-far more often than those other departments
include faculty trained in law.
Several factors seem to be converging to make the law schools a seething
ferment of interdisciplinary activity, like some primordial sea spontaneously
sprouting new forms of life. First, law professors (as well as lawyers andjudges)
have long been branded as generalists, and this image, insofar as it is true,
would seem to reinforce any urge to draw from whatever sources or disciplines
are useful for current scholarly needs. Second, some interdisciplinary legal
scholars undoubtedly are driven by the romantic appeal of exploring uncharted intellectual waters, rebelliously pushing the edges of the envelope, and
courageously treading on new ground (or whatever metaphor of experimentation strikes your fancy).84 Third, and most important, the disintegrating consensus on the proper methods for legal scholarship is likely to nurture interdisciplinary approaches.85 The current lack of methodological unity leads many
legal academics to experiment with alternative methods, often drawing inspiration from other academic disciplines. In turn, then, to bolster their own
interdisciplinary approaches, some of these scholars occasionally "disparage
doctrinal scholarship as part of their general denial that law can be an
autonomous field of study"-grounded on the methods of practitioners-and
even go so far as to express "an ethic of disdain or contempt for the practice
of law..8.6."
Exactly because some law professors are such prolific interdisciplinary
scholars, they might be able to establish themselves within universities as the
experts on interdisciplinarity. A functional need for interdisciplinary experts is
readily discernible: the current spread of interdisciplinary research throughout numerous university departments opens a potential domain for experts
who could provide guidance to interdisciplinary neophytes. Some law professors might be motivated to try to establish themselves as interdisciplinary
experts not only because of the romantic appeal of being on the vanguard of
intellectual thought but also because of their concerns (both conscious and
tacit) about professionalization. Like other professionals, law faculty still need
to legitimate their own societal position-their status, their income, their
power over others. To do so, they need to claim an area of thought where they
can produce and control knowledge, where they can provide expertise. If, as
posited, they no longer hold themselves out as experts in the methods of legal
and judicial practices (which for more than a century has been a tenuous
claim anyway, since many professors rarely if ever practice law), they need to
identify some other realm of thought and knowledge as their own. For the
growing cadre of law faculty who are prolific interdisciplinary scholars, a likely
province of expertise is interdisciplinarity itself.87
84. See Balkin, supra note 75, at 957-58; Schlegel, supra note 17.
85. See Balkin, supra note 75, at 962; Byrne, supra note 16, at 322-23.
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Indeed, such interdisciplinary legal writing might be useful both to university colleagues and to society at large. The professional nature of academic
disciplines drives university faculty to legitimate their positions by generating
methods, jargon, and knowledge that distinguish their own discipline from
others. To be sure, the generation and protection of disciplinary standards is
not all bad. Disciplinary standards constrain those working within a field, but
simultaneously they enable those people to approach and understand difficult problems. Training in a discipline provides one with certain tools-the
basic methods,jargon, and knowledge of the field-so that one is empowered
to perform the characteristic tasks of a professional in that discipline. Despite
such benefits professionalism constantly pushes disciplines to become ever
more specialized and isolated-and, therefore, often of less practical importance. For instance, three centuries ago philosophers frequendy wrote about
practical problems in language accessible to reasonably well-educated people.
But now that philosophy is entrenched as a university discipline with specialized training and methods-think of analytic philosophy-it has become
increasingly irrelevant to anyone outside the field. Ironically, those within a
discipline work to make the discipline more arcane so as to strengthen the
fences around it but in doing so often render it less accessible and important
to those outside the fences. Legal scholars, as interdisciplinary experts, could
help remedy this feature of academic professionalism by helping to transfer
the arcane insights of various disciplines to practical matters outside the
disciplinary fences. Legal scholars, after all, are aptly placed to perform this
function because they are university professors who focus on another societal
(extra-academic) profession, the law.
To imagine legal scholars as interdisciplinary experts, one should recognize that interdisciplinary scholarship does not entail the straightforward
adoption and mechanical application of methods from other academic disciplines. Few interdisciplinary law professors merely adopt the external behaviorist perspective of judicial decision making so popular among political
scientists. If many of them were to follow such an approach to interdisciplinary
scholarship, they would fail to differentiate themselves from professors of
political science or whatever other discipline they robotically appropriated.
Good interdisciplinary scholarship, in law or otherwise, is more creative and
synthetic than mechanical. Steve Fuller recommends moving "away from the
common idea that interdisciplinary pursuits draw their strength from building on the methods and findings of established fields. Instead ...interdisciplinary research [should] call into question the differences between the disciplines involved, and thereby serve as forums for the renegotiation of disciplinary boundaries."'
Law schools committed to interdisciplinary scholarship need to do more
than hire faculty with doctorates in fields other than law. Law faculty with
degrees in other disciplines, even those who also haveJ.D. degrees, are likely
to have strong commitments to maintaining the professional integrity of their
particular doctoral field and might, instead of encouraging interdisciplinary
88. Fuller, supra note 82, at 33.
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creativity, be inclined to insist upon strict adherence to the discrete methodology of that discipline. Even if not blatant protectors of professional turf, many
might be quick to condemn interdisciplinary efforts by any scholars lacking
the credentials of a Ph.D.89 Therefore, in addition to hiring faculty with
professional credentials from outside the law, a law school committed to
interdisciplinarity should encourage anyone interested, including those faculty with only aJ.D., to experiment with scholarly approaches that combine
and alter disciplinary methods, including traditional legal methods.
Much interdisciplinary legal scholarship produces insights that never would
have been realized if scholars had remained confined within the narrow
borders of well-defined disciplines." And yet much interdisciplinary experimentation is likely to be fruitless. Experimentation is difficult, and failures will
be many. Criticisms of interdisciplinary legal scholarship are not necessarily
either manifestations of disciplinary turf protection or reactionary efforts to
maintain the study of pure law. Some interdisciplinary legal scholarship
deserves denunciation as dilettantish, jejune,jargon-filled, or banal (or all of
the above). To be sure, a hazy line separates the amateur generalist from the
interdisciplinary expert. Nonetheless, criticism of interdisciplinarity should
be directed at the substance and quality of the scholarship rather than at the
educational credentials of the scholar. Fuller suggests that interdisciplinary
research should be evaluated by criteria that emerge from the interdisciplinary work itself, not from the entrenched standards of the already established disciplines."
Regardless of the prevalence and success of interdisciplinary legal scholarship, at least four forces seem likely to insure the continued vitality of doctrinal law reform scholarship. First, law professors will continue to teach law
students, most of whom expect to become attorneys. This shared functionthe teaching of prospective lawyers-will continue to help bind legal academics together into a single profession (as law professors) despite their otherwise
diverse interests. The teaching function also protects law professors from
possible extinction, even without scholarly cohesion within the profession. No
matter what and even whether law professors write, they still teach and
produce lawyers. The economic profitability of law schools seems likely to
induce universities to maintain them. In short, like the legal profession in
general, the law schools might be so firmly entrenched in the structures,
culture, and economy of American society that they are not seriously endangered. And, most important in terms of the connection between teaching and
scholarship, a reasonable number of law faculty probably will continue to
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teach law with the traditional emphasis on cases, rules, and principlesindeed, often using the case method-for the simple reason that the practice
of law still largely entails the manipulation of precedents (and statutes) and
doctrine. Their traditional approach to teaching, then, will likely lead at least
some of them (though not all) to write traditional scholarship-scholarship
that resonates closely with the practices of lawyers and judges.
Second, most law faculty were trained in law schools to become lawyers.
Many, before joining academia, practiced for several years, and at least some
of them continue to practice part time. Some identitified themselves so firmly
as professional attorneys before they became academics that they will continue to identify themselves primarily as lawyers and only secondarily as
university professors. When they write, they likely will produce traditional
normative legal scholarship. The persistent self-identification as a lawyer is
likely to be more widespread at lower-level schools, where interdisciplinary
legal scholarship will therefore be less than at higher-level schools.2
Third, once academic disciplines become established, they tend to "follow
trajectories that isolate them increasingly from one another ....
-93Faculty in
the sundry academic disciplines will generally be inclined to protect their
professional status within the universities, as already established. Quite simply,
faculty in all fields, law faculty included, are apt to protect their own turf.
While this article speculates that law faculty can stake out a new turf, as
interdisciplinary experts, many are likely to continue to see the traditional
methods of lawyers and judges as delineating their appropriate domain.
These professors too will continue to write traditional legal scholarship.
Fourth, practitioners likely will continue to press law professors to teach
and write in a more practical (lawyerly) fashion. Even though a yawning
chasm now stretches between practitioners and professors, and even though
practitioners might sense a diminished need for the cultural support and
legitimation previously provided by law schools, lawyers and judges still want
to control law schools and law facultics for their own professional purposes. So
long as law schools exist, lawyers and judges would just as soon have them
bolster the professional status of practitioners. In short, lawyers' and judges'
primary interest in legal education remains the legitimation of the legal
profession (read: practitioners), not the production of original or interesting
scholarship. From the perspective of practitioners, the best type of scholarship
remains the traditional variety, which reinforces and celebrates the methods
and norms of lawyers and judges.

92. Balkin notes that at "non-elite schools," interdisciplinary scholarship "has gained less of a
foothold... Balkin, supra note 75, at 951. Some reasons that faculty at lower-level law
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less prestigious universities the law faculty naturally will accrue less prestige and often less
money from their universities. Also, law teachers at these schools might have been more
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while in academia. Furthermore, at such schools the university community as a whole is likely
to provide less support for scholarship in general. Finally, at such law schools there is
probably more of a sense of urgency to prepare students for the bar examination.
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Understanding the interests of practitioners vis-i-vis professors illuminates
lawyers' and judges' criticisms of legal scholarship. Lawyers and judges who
criticize legal scholarship often suggest that law professors are too impractical,
that their scholarship is all abstract theory-whether deconstruction, hermeneutics, civic republicanism, or whatever. Yet hundreds of law journals still
publish innumerable practical articles that parse cases, emphasize legal doctrine, and recommend law reforms. If lawyers and judges actually wanted
practical guidance from the legal academy, many law faculty remain more
than willing to provide it. But despite their complaints about theoretical
scholarship, lawyers andjudges seem just as uninterested in the more practiceoriented writing. To be more precise, lawyers and judges are interested in
having professors write practice-oriented scholarship, but primarily because
the scholarship can lend legitimation to the legal profession (even if such
legitimation is no longer necessary). Lawyers and judges are not actually
interested in reading and learning from the professors. Putting this differently, lawyers and judges would prefer that law faculty think of themselves
primarily as members of the (practitioners') legal profession-albeit subordinate members-rather than as members of a separate and independent
profession or as university professors.
To Infimity, and Beyond!
Among the legal scholars focused on interdisciplinarity, different scholars
will favor different disciplines. Law and economics scholars are unlikely to
jettison their methodology for that of law and history scholars, or for that of
law and philosophy, or for that of anything else. At least for the foreseeable
future, law teachers will almost certainly not unite in a consensus about
scholarly methods and goals. One possible resolution of this discord might be
the compartmentalization of the legal academy according to interdisciplinary
orientation rather than substantive field (such as torts, contracts, and constitutional law). After an extended period ofjousting among the various types of
interdisciplinarians as well as the more traditional legal scholars, we might see
the formal or semiformal establishment of subdisciplines of legal study. 4
Leading law reviews might have subsections with articles devoted to, among
other areas, doctrinal law reform, interdisciplinarity (in general), law and
economics, legal history, and legal philosophy. Such a future already has
started to take shape. A number of specialized journals, defined by interdisciplinary methods rather than by subject matter, have recently emerged, including the Yale Journalof Law and the Humanities, the Southern CaliorniaInterdisciplinary Law Journal,and Legal Theory. Such an eclectic future seems far more
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appealing than having one group of legal scholars harass and defeat all other types. 95
I do not mean to suggest that, as law faculty today, we now can freely choose
our future-that we can, for example, autonomously choose to identify ourselves primarily as university professors. Just as a constellation of social, cultural, and economic forces have influenced the conception of the law professor throughout American history, the future of the law professor will be
similarly shaped. Of course, as individuals, we might experience a sense of
freedom to choose our own directions. Will my next article be a strict doctrinal analysis of recent Supreme Court cases on equal protection, or will it be a
historical piece on American jurisprudence? Yet, our individual choices are
themselves inevitably shaped by social and cultural forces, only some of which
are apparent. My choice for a next article will be influenced by current broad
intellectual trends, by what the Supreme Court has recently decided, by recent
law review articles, and by a host of other factors of which I may or may not be
fully cognizant.
What, then, might law professors learn from Buzz Lightyear about the
future? In Toy Story Buzz Lightyear did not freely choose either to be or to selfidentify as a toy. If freedom of choice came into play at all, it was in Buzz's
changing attitude toward being a toy: from despair to enthusiasm. Law faculty
face a similar choice. We can brood about how we are trained only to be
lawyers and thus are ill-equipped to be university professors, first and foremost. Or we can make the most of our current situation in a time when
disciplinary fences are collapsing, for better or worse. As interdisciplinary
experts, we may flourish on our university campuses as few law professors have
done before. As Buzz Lightyear exclaims, "To infinity, and beyond!"

95.

For what it's worth, I would like law school curricula to emphasize equally three different
areas: substantive law, practice-oriented skills, and law in society (philosophy, history, social
theory, and so forth). Before graduation a student would take roughly the same number of
courses in each of these areas. Graduate law programs (beyond theJ.D. degree) could afford
students more of an opportunity to specialize.

